No good choices for the British government in the Brexit negotiations by Donnelly, Brendan
No	good	choices	for	the	British	government	in	the
Brexit	negotiations
David	Davis	has	been	criticised	in	some	quarters	for	spending	only	two	hours	in	Brussels	this	week
negotiating	with	Michel	Barnier	before	returning	hurriedly	to	London.	This	criticism	is	misplaced,
writes	Brendan	Donnelly.	As	Secretary	of	State	for	Exiting	the	European	Union,	Davis	needs	to
exercise	the	closest	possible	control	on	all	the	negotiations	relating	to	Brexit.	Most	of	these
negotiations	are	currently	taking	place	in	London,	within	the	government	of	which	Davis	is	a
member.
The	EU’s	negotiators	have,	as	is	well	known,	been	able	to	impose	on	the	negotiations	in	Brussels	a	“sequencing”
of	topics	to	be	discussed.	Similar	“sequencing”	applies	to	the	London	end	of	the	negotiations.		David	Davis	needs
to	conclude	his	Brexit	negotiations	with	his	colleagues	in	London	before	he	can	rationally	engage	in		Brexit
negotiations	with	Michel	Barnier.		These	negotiations	in	London	show	little	sign,	however,	of	coming	to	any	early
conclusion.
Opponents	of	Theresa	May	and	her	government	have	been	understandably	critical	of	the	Conservative	Party’s
failure	to	evolve,	more	than	a	year	after	the	referendum	of	2016,	a	coherent	negotiating	strategy	for	Brexit.	For
these	critics,	the	picture	of	Davis	in	Brussels	earlier	this	week	sitting	opposite	Barnier,	the	latter	apparently
consulting	his	copious	files,	while	the	Secretary	of	State	had	no	documents	of	any	description	in	front	of	him,
eloquently	summarised	the	different	levels	of	preparation	between	the	two	sides.	A	favoured	cliché	of	continental
commentaries	in	this	context	is	that	the	British	“do	not	know	what	they	want.”		This	particular	accusation	is
incorrect.	The	British	government	knows	exactly	what	it	wants,	which	is	systematic	“cherry-picking”	of	the
perceived	advantages	of	membership	of	the	European	Union	combined	with	the	systematic	unpicking	of	the
obligations	of	such	membership.		This,	after	all,	is	what	they	promised	the	electorate	in	last	year’s	referendum
campaign.	It	is,	of	course,	true	that	the	British	government	has	not	yet	found	any	plausible	negotiating	strategy	for
bringing	this	happy	combination	about.	There	are	however	powerful	political	and	psychological	reasons	why	May
and	her	colleagues	are	reluctant	to	admit	that	no	such	negotiating	strategy	exists	indeed	or	could	ever	exist.
the	government	wants	“cherry-picking”	of	the	advantages	of	membership	of	the
EU	combined	with	the	unpicking	of	the	obligations
With	rare	exceptions,	advocates	of	Brexit	during	the	referendum	campaign	last	year	presented	the	situation	of	the
United	Kingdom	outside	the	European	Union	as	being	unambiguously	better,	both	economically	and	politically,
than	the	damaging	vassalage	of	membership	in	the	Union.	Nigel	Farage	was,	to	his	credit,	one	the	few	on	the
“Leave”	side	of	the	argument	who	sometimes	accepted	that	there	might	be	some	trade-off	between	economic	and
political	components	of	the	Brexit	equation.	The	present	Conservative	ministers	David	Davis,	Boris	Johnson,
Liam	Fox	and	Michael	Gove	all	painted	in	particularly	glowing	colours	at	this	time	last	year	the	beguiling
economic	and	political	future	they	saw	for	the	United	Kingdom	outside	the	European	Union.		It	is	precisely	this
unqualified	enthusiasm	for	Brexit,	both	in	their	public	utterance	and	probably	also	in	their	private	thoughts,	which
now	makes	it	so	difficult	for	them	to	adopt	any	coherent	or	plausible	negotiating	strategy	for	the	Brexit
negotiations	in	Brussels.	To	adopt,	or	even	to	envisage	the	compromises	necessary	for	agreement	with	the	rest
of	the	EU,	would	be	a	recognition	that	Brexit	was	sold	to	the	British	electorate	on	a	false	prospectus.	Far	from
improving	the	United	Kingdom’s	position	in	the	world,	Brexit	can	only	diminish	it.
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MEPs	agree	on	key
conditions	for	approving	UK	withdrawal	agreement	–	Michel	Barnier.	Image	by	European	Parliament,	(Flickr),	licenced	under
CC	BY-NC-ND	2.0.
Whatever	the	details	of	the	negotiations	in	Brussels,	the	British	government	is	confronted	with	three	basic	options
for	its	future	relationship	with	the	European	Union.	It	can	opt	for	minimum	change	from	the	status	quo;	it	can	opt
for	maximal	change	from	the	status	quo;	or	it	can	opt	for	a	half-way	house	between	the	two.	None	of	these
options	is	attractive	and	all	are	demonstrably	inferior	to	the	present	state	of	affairs.	It	would	make	no	political
sense	to	leave	the	European	Union	simply	to	enter	into	a	similar,		but	less	empowering	arrangement	along	the
lines	of	the	EEA;	it	would	make	no	economic	sense	to	substitute	in	less	than	two	years	time	for	the	sophisticated
and	well-established	legal	framework	of	the		European	Union	the	sketchy	general	principles	of	the	WTO;	and	an
uneasy	compromise	between	these	two	extremes	would	almost	certainly	take	many	years	to	negotiate	and	would
be	neither	economically	nor	politically	persuasive.	In	reality,	its	commitment	to	the	Brexit	option	leaves	the	British
government	with	no	attractive	strategy	in	its	negotiations	with	the	rest	of	the	European	Union.	It	is	a
misconception	to	imagine	that	it	is	simply	bureaucratic	unpreparedness	that	is	holding	back	the	United	Kingdom
in	its	present	painful	negotiations	with	Barnier	and	his	team.	It	is	rather	the	nature	of	the	Brexit	project	itself,	which
simply	presents	the	British	government	with	a	range	of	symmetrically	uncongenial	options.	None	of	these	options
corresponds	to	the	optimistic	basis	on	which	British	withdrawal	from	the	European	Union	was	advocated	in	the
confused	and	misleading	referendum	of	last	year.
If	May	had	won	in	the	recent	General	Election	the	substantial	overall	majority	for	which	she	hoped,	she	might
have	found	it	possible	at	least	temporarily	to	choose	one	of	the	three	basic	options	for	Brexit	and	work	towards	it.
Her	personal	authority	might	well	have	allowed	her	to	suppress	opposition	from	within	her	own	party	to	whatever
unsatisfactory	path	she	had	chosen.	Her	diminished	stature	as	a	result	of	the	electoral	debacle	of	8th	June	means
that	no	such	option	is	open	to	her.	Her	Party	must	inevitably	default	back	to	unending	internal	conflict	about	which
approach	to	Brexit	is	the	least	harmful.	This	is	a	conflict	that	can	never	be	resolved,	because,	as	Doctor	Johnson
might	have	put	it,	the	tenement-dwellers	are	“arguing	from	different	premises.”		There	is	no	meeting-point
between	the	economic	calculations	of	Philip	Hammond	and	the	political	motivations	that	drive	many	of	his	most
Eurosceptic	colleagues	in	the	Conservative	Parliamentary	Party.
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Now	that	Article	50	of	the	Lisbon	Treaty	has	been	triggered,	the	inevitable	incapacity	of	the	Conservative	Party	to
fix	and	pursue	a	course	towards	Brexit	has	a	disturbing	consequence	unforeseen	by	the	authors	of	that	Article.
As	long	as	it	is	the	present	Conservative	government	that	is	conducting	the	Brexit	negotiations,	the	United
Kingdom	is	condemned	to	the	hardest	of	hard	Brexits,	in	a	way	entirely	welcome	to	the	most	radical	Eurosceptics
of	the	Conservative	Party.	A	catastrophic	and	chaotic	Brexit,	which	can	be	blamed	to	an	ignorant	British	public	on
the	supposed	intransigence	of	Barnier,	is	likely	to	be	an	altogether	more	palatable	prospect	for	Fox,	Johnson	and
Davis	than	a	protracted	negotiation	which	provides	as	daily	object	lesson	in	the	self-harming	absurdity	of	Brexit.	
The	Conservative	Party	will	in	the	last	analysis	always	be	immune	to	pressure	from	its	negotiating	partners	in
Brussels.	It	is	too	busy	negotiating	with	itself	to	pay	excessive	heed	to	Barnier	and	his	colleagues.
It	might	have	been	hoped	that	in	a	mature	Parliamentary	democracy	such	as	the	United	Kingdom,	the	toxicity	of
Conservative	divisions	over	Europe	would	have	provoked	within	the	party	or	among	the	parties	of	opposition
some	elements	of	self-healing	resistance.		An	optimistic	observer	might	well	see	in	the	indecisive	General
Election	the	first	steps	towards	questioning	May’s	commitment	to	leaving	the	single	European	market	and	the
Customs	Union	as	building-blocks	of	Brexit’s	meaning	Brexit.	A	more	pessimistic	observer	might	see	by	contrast
a	depressing	absence	of	coherent	and	principled	opposition	to	Brexit	from	the	Labour	Party	in	particular.	The
Shadow	Business	Secretary	Rebecca	Long-Bailey	was	recently	reduced	to	defending	Labour’s	European	policy
as	“having	our	cake	and	eating	it,”	while	Tony	Blair	showed	that	the	avoidance	of	hard	choices	remains	his
favoured	mode	of	European	policy	by	the	disingenuous	claim	that	our	European	partners	were	weakening	in	their
commitment	to	free	movement.	As	the	negative	consequences	of	Brexit	become	daily	clearer	over	the	coming
months,	the	Labour	Party	will	undoubtedly	wish	to	exploit	the	growing	embarrassment	of	the	Conservative
government	in	this	area.	But	the	hostility	of	Jeremy	Corbyn	and	John	McDonnell	to	the	European	Union	is	long-
standing	and	well-documented.	Their	reinforced	position	at	the	head	of	the	Labour	Party	will	act	as	a	major
barrier	to	the	emergence	of	a	Labour	European	policy	fundamentally	opposed	to	Brexit	rather	than	looking	simply
to	mitigate	its	perceived	worst	effects.
The	former	Governor	of	the	Bank	of	England,	Lord	Leigh-Pemberton,	was	fond	of	saying	that	anyone	could
predict	the	future,	but	it	was	much	more	difficult	to	know	when	and	how	it	would	happen.	His	dictum	is	particularly
applicable	to	the	Brexit	debate.	Many	analysts	expected	the	internal	contradictions	and	incoherence	of	the	case
for	Brexit	to	have	manifested	themselves	more	quickly	than	has	turned	out	to	be	the	case.	Few	commentators
could	have	predicted	that	May’s	lost	Parliamentary	majority	would	have	ushered	in	such	a	now	daily	growing
assault	from	business,	academia	and	civil	society	on	the	rationality	and	even	achievability	of	British	withdrawal
from	the	European	Union.	This	assault	is	likely	to	persist	and	even	grow	in	ferocity.
It	may	well	be	that	in	six	months	time	the	trickle	of	voters	changing	their	mind	about	Brexit	identified	by	the
opinion	polls	will	have	become	a	torrent.	If	that	is	so,	the	natural	expectation	must	be	that	this	recasting	of	public
opinion	will	have	measurable	political	consequences	in	each	of	the	main	parties.	When	it	seems	prudent	to	do	so,
the	great	majority	of	the	Labour	Parliamentary	Party	and	a	small	minority	of	the	Conservative	Parliamentary	Party
may	well	be	willing	to	give	public	expression	to	their	rejection	of	Brexit	and	the	irrationality	that	sustains	it.	The
past	year	has	been	rich	in	sensational	political	developments.		A	united	front	of	Parliamentarians	finally	willing	to
fulfil	their	traditional	role	as	guardians	of	the	national	interest	by	declaring	that	“enough	is	enough”	on	Brexit	is	an
entirely	conceivable	next	twist	of	the	kaleidoscope.
An	earlier	version	of	this	post	appeared	on	The	Federal	Trust	and	it	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not
those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.	
Brendan	Donnelly	has	been	Director	of	the	Federal	Trust	since	January	2003	and	is	a	Senior	Research	Fellow	at
the	Global	Policy	Institute.	He	is	a	former	Member	of	the	European	Parliament	(1994	to	1999).
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